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The Eﬀects of Market Structure on Industry
Growth: Rivalrous Nonexcludable Capital
Abstract
We analyze imperfect competition in dynamic environments where ﬁrms use rivalrous but
nonexcludable industry-speciﬁc capital that is provided exogenously. Capital depreciation
depends on utilization, so ﬁrms inﬂuence the evolution of the capital equipment through
more or less intensive supply in the ﬁnal-goods market. Strategic incentives stem from,
(i) a dynamic externality, arising due to the non-excludability of the capital stock, leading
ﬁrms to compete for its use (rivalry), and, (ii) a market externality, leading to the classic
Cournot-type supply competition. Comparing alternative market structures, we isolate the
eﬀect of these externalities on strategies and industry growth.
Keywords: Cournot competition, oligopolistic non-cooperative dynamic games, tragedy of
the commons
JEL classification: D43, D92, L13, Q20, O12
Christos Koulovatianos Leonard J. Mirman
Department of Economics Department of Economics
University of Vienna University of Virginia
Hohenstaufengasse 9 114 Rous Hall
A-1010, Vienna, Austria. Charlottesville, VA 22903, USA.
e-mail: koulovc6@univie.ac.at e-mail: lm8h@virginia.edu
2
1. Introduction
The role of capital deepening on economic growth is usually studied through highly aggre-
gated growth models. In these models, typically focusing on the macroeconomy, perfect
competition is the prevailing market structure. Yet, little attention has been paid to the
forces and incentives behind capital deepening and growth in smaller markets, like industries.
In a signiﬁcant number of industries, ﬁrms sell their ﬁnal products in imperfectly com-
petitive markets. Classic Cournot-type oligopolistic incentives arise in such industries. Yet,
whenever speciﬁc capital is useful for production, each ﬁrm’s intertemporal capital alloca-
tion is an additional strategic lever, apart from its supply strategy. By accumulating capital,
a ﬁrm can use its productive capacity to aﬀect its oligopolistic competitiveness and proﬁt
margin over time.
We focus on industries with production that relies on the use of a speciﬁc type of capital,
infrastructure, speciﬁc equipment, or a natural resource, which is provided exogenously.
Capital in our analysis is nonexcludable, it can be used at no cost by all ﬁrms, and also
rivalrous, subject to a ﬁrst-come ﬁrst-served rule or to congestion costs. Moreover, capital
in our study depreciates with utilization. Thus, higher aggregate production in the industry
today implies lower capital in the future.
The key to understanding the link between market structure and industry dynamics in
such an environment is to analyze the fundamental strategic incentives that arise, (i) from
the interaction of ﬁrms in the market for the ﬁnal good, a market externality among ﬁrms,
and (ii) from the interaction of ﬁrms in the process that determines future capital deepening,
a dynamic externality among ﬁrms.1 To isolate the impact of each externality on aggregate
industry production, and hence, industry growth, we build a parametric model that allows
1 The terms “dynamic externality” and “market externality” were coined by Mirman [9], who pointed out
the distinction of the two eﬀects in the necessary conditions of a general framework of ﬁshing games.
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us to encompass four market structures, namely, (a) a single ﬁrm monopolistic industry, (b)
an industry with two monopolists selling the ﬁnal product in their own separate markets but
utilizing capital from the same provider, (c) a duopoly with ﬁrms selling in the same market
and utilizing capital from the same provider, and (d) a duopoly with ﬁrms utilizing capital
from separate providers.
The nature of the two externalities brings signiﬁcant technical complexities into the dy-
namic problem faced by each ﬁrm in such noncooperative games. The presence of these
externalities in the dynamic game makes the strategies of competitors part of the structural
maximization problem of a ﬁrm. In order that the problem of each ﬁrm be well-deﬁned,
the primitives of the model should imply that the equilibrium strategies possess convenient
functional properties. So, we model the economic environment to obtain linear equilibrium
strategies that make the analysis tractable. In order to accomplish this we use homogeneous
or isoelastic functions to capture consumer demand and the primitives of ﬁrms. Our para-
metric model is essentially an extension of the example of Levhari and Mirman [8], that is
designed to accommodate the market externality, as well as the dynamic externality.
In a fashion similar to Levhari and Mirman [8], a comparison of market structure (a)
with (b) reveals the impact of the dynamic externality. Our results suggest the dominance of
a commons problem, i.e. more ﬁrms induce higher aggregate supply and lower growth.2 The
comparison of (a) with (c), and of (b) with (c), reveal the impact of the market externality in
addition to the dynamic externality, the core contribution of this paper.3 Compared to the
benchmark monopoly, we ﬁnd that the aggregate supply of ﬁrms in each period is always
2 See, for example, Mirman [9], Levhari and Mirman [8], who were the ﬁrst to analyze the commons problem
using noncooperative dynamic games, and also Amir [1], Sundaram [11], Benhabib and Radner [2], Dutta
and Sundaram [3] and [4], and Sorger [10], who apply their analysis to natural-resource games, focusing
mostly on the commons problem.
3 To our knowledge, the economic impact of the market externality on ﬁnal good supply strategies in such
a dynamic environment has not been studied before.
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higher. But compared to the market structure of two monopolists with common capital
utilization, the impact depends on the model’s primitives. We ﬁnd that below a threshold
level for the demand elasticity (depending only on the number of ﬁrms in the market), the
aggregate supply of ﬁrms increases compared to the structure of two monopolists. When the
demand elasticity is higher than that threshold level, the aggregate supply of two monopolists
can be higher than the aggregate supply of the duopolists, depending on other primitives.
These primitives are: convexity of the cost function, elasticity of capital renewal, interest
rates, and a utilization-dependent depreciation technology.
With respect to market structure (d), a duopoly with two capital providers, we show that
this problem is very complex, as it involves two capital stocks and strategic considerations
about the evolution of both stocks by both ﬁrms. Yet, we characterize, analytically, the
symmetric strategies of ﬁrms within our parametric framework, which turn out to be linear
with respect to the two capital stocks.
Our framework and analysis ﬁt directly industries with production based on natural
resources. However, they are not limited to these applications. Indeed they are applicable
in industries that utilize capital from outside providers and the capital is rivalrous and non-
excludable. Examples of publicly provided infrastructure are airports, harbors, roads, pipe-
lines, transmission grids, railroads, or telecommunications lines. Governments determine
and control the full provision and the growth rate of the available public infrastructure.
Typically, governments follow rules for ﬁnancing its maintenance or growth.4 Capital in our
study depreciates with utilization. So, the evolution of speciﬁc capital, and, consequently the
long-run growth of industries that use it, depend on the production, i.e., aggregate supply
decisions of ﬁrms; more intensive use increases the cost of its maintenance or speeds up
4 For example, a government may use a constant fraction of the ﬁscal budget every year in order to ﬁnance
a certain type of infrastructure.
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depreciation. Often, governments impose special taxes on ﬁrms for the use of roads or ports,
in order to slow down the depreciation of these structures.5
Another important example of speciﬁc capital is human resources in basic research. Ba-
sic research activities, usually taking place in universities, target inventions. Research for
marketable innovations, on the other hand, is usually ﬁnanced by ﬁrms. Industries may
take human resources out of universities, out of basic research activities, in order to direct
them to market-oriented innovations.6 The time of researchers is rivalrous and also wasted
from producing inventions, a critical determinant for the growth rate of revolutionary new
knowledge.
In section 2 we present the general formulation of the ﬁrm problems in market structures
with rivalrous and nonexcludable capital, whereas in Section 3 we conduct our economic
analysis through a parametric model. In Section 4 we analyze the case of a duopoly where
ﬁrms utilize capital from their own, exclusive provider.
2. Economic environment and alternative market structures
Time is discrete with an inﬁnite horizon, t = 0, 1, .... Consumer demand for the ﬁnal good, q,
is characterized by the inverse-demand function, pt = D (qt), in each period. Speciﬁc capital,
denoted as k, is necessary for production. In particular, the production of q units of the
5 An extension is to endogenize the supply process of public infrastructure. Using modeling and theoretical
insights from our current paper can help towards this direction. For example, utilizing the techniques of the
present study, Koulovatianos and Mirman [6] examine the link between market structure and industry growth
when ﬁrms pursue cost-reducing knowledge accumulation through R&D investment, using an alternative
model speciﬁcation that endogenizes the private provision of capital (knowledge in that case). Yet, they
point out the same strategic elements behind ﬁrm behavior, namely the importance of the dynamic and the
market externality.
6 For example, the high attrition rates in computer science graduate programs or engineering, can be ex-
plained by the eﬀort of companies to tempt students to work on innovations concerning their IT products,
by oﬀering higher salaries.
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ﬁnal good requires that ψ (q) units of capital are consumed by utilization, with ψ′ (q) > 0.7
Capital obeys an exogenous rule of renewal, depending on previous period’s stock, namely,
kt+1 = f (kt), with f
′ (k) > 0. When N ﬁrms exploit the same capital stock in order for
each of them to produce a quantity, qi,t in period t, with i ∈ {1, ..., N}, the law of motion of
capital is,
kt+1 = f (kt)−
N∑
i=1
ψ (qi,t) . (1)
In order to produce output, ﬁrms also need to hire labor. The cost of labor, l, in period t,
is given by, ct = c (lt), where c
′ > 0. The capital stock has a positive eﬀect on production
capacity. The capital stock augments the productivity of labor, reducing per unit produc-
tion costs. In the case of infrastructure, more infrastructure means less congestion during
productive activities. When capital is a natural resource, abundance of the resource reduces
search costs or costs of extraction of a unit of the resource. The production technology is
given by qt = F (kt, lt), with F2 > 0 and F1, F12 ≥ 0. Hence, for a particular level of available
capital, k, in order to produce a certain quantity of ﬁnal good, q, at least lt = L (kt, qt) units
of labor are needed (where L1 ≤ 0, and L2 > 0). Substituting the least necessary labor for
producing q into c (lt), the cost for producing the ﬁnal good, given a speciﬁc level of capital
is, ct = c (L (kt, qt)) ≡ C (kt, qt), with C2 > 0 and C1 ≤ 0.
2.1 The Dynamic Monopoly
The objective of the dynamic monopoly, our benchmark market structure, is to determine
a supply-quantity decision rule as a function of the available capital, q = Q (k), so that
7 So, in the case where capital is some form of infrastructure, capital depreciates endogenously. Capital
utilization wears equipment out, or it leaves less time for its maintenance. This idea of capital utilization
is also studied by Greenwood et. al. [5] in a general-equilibrium framework. In the case where capital is
a natural resource (renewable or not) and units of this natural resource are necessary as raw material for
producing the ﬁnal good, producing a certain level of output requires the consumption of part of this stock.
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lifetime proﬁts,
∞∑
t=0
δt [D (qt) qt − C (kt, qt)] , (2)
are maximized, given k0 > 0. Here, δ ≡ 1/ (1 + r), the proﬁt discount factor, is determined
by an exogenous constant interest rate r > 0.
The problem of the monopolist can be written in Bellman-equation form,
VM (k) =max
q≥0
{D (q) q − C (k, q) + δVM (f (k)− ψ (q))} , (3)
which yields the Euler equation,
D (q) +D′ (q) q − C2 (k, q)
ψ′ (q)
= δ
⎧⎨⎩−C1 (k̂, q̂)+ D (q̂) +D
′ (q̂) q̂ − C2
(
k̂, q̂
)
ψ′ (q̂)
f
′
(
k̂
)⎫⎬⎭ , (4)
where q̂ is the output strategy of the ﬁrm in the subsequent period. A static monopoly sets
the right-hand side of equation (4) to zero, while a dynamic monopoly takes into account
the inﬂuence that its current supply has on the evolution of capital in the future. The Euler
equation (4) serves as the benchmark equation for understanding the strategic elements
that appear in other market structures, when the dynamic and the market externality are
introduced.
2.2 Two monopolists utilizing capital from the same provider: the
dynamic externality
Consider two identical ﬁrms, A and B, each selling in their own market as a monopolist,
facing the same demand function, having the same cost function, and utilizing capital from
the same provider. So, capital evolves according to, kt+1 = f (kt) − ψ (qA,t) − ψ (qB,t), i.e.,
the two monopolists have a direct capital accumulation interaction. The presence of both
ﬁrms using the same source of capital gives rise to a dynamic externality.
6
The problem of ﬁrm A in Bellman equation form is given by,
VA,m (k) =max
qA≥0
{D (qA) qA − C (k, qA) qA + δVA,m (f (k)− ψ (qA)− ψ (QB,m (k)))} , (5)
where VA,m is the value function of ﬁrm A and QB,m (k) is the supply strategy, as a function
of the capital stock, of ﬁrmB.8 The problem of ﬁrmB is given by a Bellman equation similar
to (5), with the roles of A and B switched. With QB,m (k), the strategy of ﬁrm B, being
part of the Bellman equation of ﬁrm A, it is not generally possible to identify conditions that
imply the concavity of VA,m, the existence of equilibrium, or useful properties of strategies,
such as continuity and monotonicity.9
The necessary condition implied by (5) is,
D (qA) +D
′ (qA) qA − C2 (k, qA)
ψ′ (qA)
= δ
⎧⎨⎩−C1 (k̂, q̂A) +
+
D (q̂A) +D
′ (q̂A) q̂A − C2
(
k̂, q̂A
)
ψ′ (q̂A)
[
f ′
(
k̂
)
− ψ′
(
QB
(
k̂
))
Q′B
(
k̂
)]⎫⎬⎭ , (6)
where q̂A is the output strategy of ﬁrm A in the next period. The diﬀerence between the
necessary condition of the benchmark monopoly, (4), and (6), is that the term f ′
(
k̂
)
is
replaced by f ′
(
k̂
)
− ψ′
(
QB
(
k̂
))
Q′B
(
k̂
)
. The dynamic externality is due to the presence
of the other player’s strategy in the production of future capital.
8 We denote the setup of two monopolists exploiting capital from the same provider using the subscript
‘m,’ distinguishing it from the benchmark monopoly model of the previous subsection, which goes with the
subscript ‘M .’
9 Mirman [9] presents examples of ‘classic’ or seemingly ‘innocent’ (at least in the single monopolist case)
functional forms used to capture the fundamentals of this two-monopolist setup, where the value function
VA,m is not concave, or not continuous, and the strategy QA,m is not continuous or monotonic. In fact,
in many cases QA,m is not a function, but a correspondence. Yet, Levhari and Mirman [8] use speciﬁc
parametric forms in order to overcome the technical complexities arising from the diﬃculty in characterizing
QB,m (k). In particular, their functional forms imply that QB,m (k) is a linear function in k. In our
parametric framework that appears in the following section, QB,m (k) is also linear in k, and thus VA,m
is concave throughout the whole domain of k. So, we proceed under the convention that every desirable
property is present.
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2.3 Duopoly with ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same provider:adding
the market externality
When the second ﬁrm is also present in the same market for the ﬁnal good, the Bellman
equation of ﬁrm A becomes,
VA,d (k) =max
qA≥0
{D (qA +QB (k)) qA − C (k, qA) + δVA,d (f (k)− ψ (qA)− ψ (QB (k)))} ,
(7)
whereQB (k) is the supply strategy of ﬁrmB, and VA,d (k) is the value function ofA, denoting
this market structure using the subscript “d.” The corresponding necessary condition is now,
D (qA +QB (k)) +D
′ (qA +QB (k)) qA − C2 (k, qA)
ψ′ (qA)
= δ
⎧⎨⎩D′ (q̂A +QB (k)) q̂AQ′B (k̂) −
−C1
(
k̂, q̂A
)
+
D
(
q̂A +QB
(
k̂
))
+D′
(
q̂A +QB
(
k̂
))
q̂A − C2
(
k̂, q̂A
)
ψ′ (q̂A)
×
×
[
f ′
(
k̂
)
− ψ′
(
QB
(
k̂
))
Q′B
(
k̂
)] ⎫⎬⎭ . (8)
As in the previous section, the dynamic externality is embodied in the term ψ′
(
QB
(
k̂
))
Q′B
(
k̂
)
,
appearing at the end of the right hand side of equation (8). Yet, the termsQB (k) andQB
(
k̂
)
also appear on the current and next period’s marginal proﬁt of ﬁrm A. More interestingly,
as the term D′ (q̂A +QB (k)) q̂AQ
′
B
(
k̂
)
of (8) reveals, ﬁrm A takes into account the impact
of the change in next period’s supply strategy of the competitor, QB
(
k̂
)
, on next period’s
marginal revenue of A, through the competitor’s manipulation of future supply. This is a
pure Cournot consideration due to a market competitor, i.e., a market externality.
3. A parametric model encompassing all three market structures
We have shown that there are two externalities present when two ﬁrms supply in the same
market and utilize capital from the same provider, a dynamic externality and a market
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externality. From these externalities, strategic incentives arise due to the interaction of
the ﬁrms with each other in the market for the ﬁnal good, as well as in the process that
determines future capital deepening. These incentives are fundamental to the link between
market structure and industry dynamics. However, we are not able to characterize the
economic impact of these externalities on growth, since the model we have described so far
is too general to study in this setting. To achieve this goal, we develop a common parametric
framework that encompasses all three market structures that were analyzed in the previous
section.
Let the inverse demand function in the market for the ﬁnal product, q, be,
D (q) = q−
1
η , with η > 1 , (9)
and
f (k) =
(
αk1−
1
η + φ
) η
η−1
with φ ≥ 0 , (10)
i.e. the intertemporal production function of capital is a CES function. Endogenous depre-
ciation is captured by the function,
ψ (q) = θq , with θ ∈ (0, 1] .
In other words, the depreciation of capital is proportional to the supply of the ﬁnal good in
each period. The ﬁnal-good production function is,
q = F (k, l) =
(
αk1−
1
η + φ
) ζη
η−1
lυ , with ζ ∈ (0, 1) and υ > 0 . (11)
The labor-cost function is, c (l) = νlξ, with ν ∈ (0, 1) and ξ > 0. Therefore, after solving
(11) for l, which yields L (k, q), the cost function is,
C (k, q) = c (L (k, q)) = ν
(
αk1−
1
η + φ
)− ξζη
υ(η−1)
q
ξ
υ = ν [f (k)]−β qρ , (12)
where β ≡ ξζ/υ and ρ ≡ ξ/υ.
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3.1 Parameter restrictions and scope of analysis
In order to obtain strategies of the form Q (k) = ωf (k) for all ﬁrms and for all market
structures, we set the restrictions,
ρ− β = 1−
1
η
, (13)
and
ρ > 1−
1
2η
. (14)
The ﬁrst parameter restriction, given by (13), implies linear strategies, while the second
constraint, (14), guarantees a unique equilibrium in all market structures.
The parameters, α, φ, η, θ, υ, ξ, φ, give enough degrees of freedom for studying the
empirical link between the market structure and the growth rate in industries. Moreover,
as we prove below, none of the strategies is inﬂuenced by the value of parameter φ. Yet,
diﬀerent values for parameter φ imply diﬀerent dynamics and the selection of φ is useful for
addressing diﬀerent economic questions. Speciﬁcally, (i) by setting φ = 0 and α ∈
[
1, 1
δ
]
,
the intertemporal production function of capital is f (k) = α
η
η−1k = Zk, a growth theory
ingredient that can lead to perpetual growth for the market if α ∈
(
1, 1
δ
]
,10 and, (ii) by
setting φ > 0 and α ∈ (0, 1), the model implies a zero growth steady state.
3.2 Equilibrium in the three market structures
For the cases of, (i) the benchmark monopolist (carrying the subscript “M”), (ii) two monop-
olists utilizing capital from the same provider (subscript “m”), and (iii) duopolists utilizing
capital from the same provider (subscript “d”), the state space of all these three games
is one-dimensional, namely there is one state variable, k. Thus, we can accommodate the
calculation of the strategies in all three market structures in a single presentation.
10The upper bound 1
δ
on the parameter α guarantees the boundedness of the value function of each ﬁrm.
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Let Nµ be the number of ﬁrms in the same market, with Nµ ∈ {1, 2}, and also let Nκ
be the number of ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same source, with Nκ ∈ {1, 2}.
11 The
maximization problem of ﬁrm j ∈ {1, ..., Nµ}∩ {1, ..., Nκ} is given by,
max
{(qj,t,kt+1)}
∞
t=0
∞∑
t=0
δt
⎡⎣(Nµ∑
i=1
qi,t
)− 1
η
qj,t − νy
−β
t q
ρ
j,t
⎤⎦ (P1)
subject to,
kt+1 = yt − θ
Nκ∑
i=1
qi,t (15)
given k0 > 0, where yt ≡ f (kt), with f (kt) given by (10), and with parameters β and ρ
obeying the restrictions given by (13) and (14).
To solve problem (P1), we use the linear symmetric strategies, qi,t = ωyt, for all other
players, i = j, with ω treated as an undetermined coeﬃcient, and we calculate the value
function, obtaining,
V (k0) =
α
(
N
− 1
η
µ ω
1− 1
η − νωρ
)
1− αδ (1− θNκω)
1− 1
η
k
1− 1
η
0 + b , (16)
where b is a constant. The Bellman equation of ﬁrm j ∈ {1, ..., Nµ}∩ {1, ..., Nκ} is given by,
V (k) =max
qj≥0
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
(
Nµ∑
i=1
qi
)− 1
η
qj − νy
−βqρj +
αδ
(
N
− 1
η
µ ω
1− 1
η − νωρ
)
1− αδ (1− θNκω)
1− 1
η
(
y − θ
Nκ∑
i=1
qi
)1− 1
η
+ δb
⎫⎪⎪⎬⎪⎪⎭ ,
with ﬁrst-order condition,
(
Nµ∑
i=1
qi
y
)− 1
η
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎝1−
qj
y
η
Nµ∑
i=1
qi
y
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎠−ρνyρ−β−1+ 1η
(
qj
y
)ρ−1
=
=
αδθ
(
1− 1
η
)(
N
− 1
η
µ ω
1− 1
η − νωρ
)
1− αδ (1− θNκω)
1− 1
η
(
1− θ
Nκ∑
i=1
qi
y
)− 1
η
. (17)
11For the benchmark monopoly, Nµ = Nκ = 1. For the two monopolists with a common capital provider,
Nµ = 1 and Nκ = 2. Whereas, for the duopolists with a common capital provider, Nµ = Nκ = 2.
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Thus, applying condition (13) to (17) conﬁrms that all strategies are of the form qi,t = ωyt,
for all i ∈ {1, ..., Nµ}∩ {1, ..., Nκ}. The symmetry of the ﬁrms implies that all strategies are
the same, so substituting qi,t = ωyt into (17) and rearranging terms, the condition that gives
parameter ω is,
(Nµω)
− 1
η
(
1− 1
ηNµ
)
− ρνωρ−1
(Nµω)
− 1
η − νωρ−1
=
αδθ
(
1− 1
η
)
ω
(1− θNκω)
1
η − αδ (1− θNκω)
. (18)
The strategies of the ﬁrms are admissible if the maximization problem of each ﬁrm is well-
deﬁned. In our setup, the key to admissibility is that θNκω ∈ [0, 1). Using (13), condition
(18) becomes,
g (χ) ≡
(θNκ)
β Nµ
− 1
η
(
1− 1
ηNµ
)
χ−β − ρν
(θNκ)
β Nµ
− 1
ηχ−β − ν
=
αδ
Nκ
(
1− 1
η
)
χ
(1− χ)
1
η − αδ (1− χ)
≡ h (χ) , (19)
with χ ≡ θNκω. The properties of g (χ) for χ ∈ [0, 1] are,
g (0) = 1−
1
ηNµ
, and g′ (χ) < 0 , (20)
where g′ (χ) < 0 is implied by the parameter restriction, (14).12 The properties of h (χ)
when χ ∈ [0, 1] are,
h (0) = 0 , h (1) =∞ , and h′ (χ) > 0 , (21)
where h′ (χ) > 0, for all χ ∈ [0, 1] if αδ
Nκ
< 1. Whereas, if αδ
Nκ
= 1, h′ (1) = 0 and h′ (χ) > 0,
for all χ ∈ (0, 1].13
12For an exhaustive discussion of this point see footnote 15 in Koulovatianos and Mirman [7].
13Speciﬁcally,
h′ (χ) =
(
1−
1
η
)
αδ
Nκ
1−(1− 1
η
)χ
(1−χ)
1−
1
η
− αδ
[
(1− χ)
1
η − αδ (1− χ)
]2 .
Noticing that 1−
(
1− 1
η
)
χ ≥ (1− χ)1−
1
η , for all χ ∈ [0, 1] with equality if and only if χ = 0, the fact that
αδ
N
κ
≤ 1 implies that h′ (χ) > 0, for all χ ∈ (0, 1].
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Figure 1 summarizes graphically the properties given by (20) and (21), and depicts why
the equilibrium strategies, denoted by ω∗, in all three market structures, are both admissible
(speciﬁcally, θNκω
∗ ∈ (0, 1)), and unique for the region of non-negative marginal proﬁts,
and thus, for the region where each period’s proﬁts are strictly positive.
3.3 The impact of the dynamic externality
In order to assess the impact of the dynamic externality on ﬁrm strategies, and, in particular,
whether the ‘tragedy of the commons’ dominates, we compare the benchmark monopoly case
with the case of two monopolies utilizing capital from the same provider. This comparison
is given by the following proposition.
Proposition 1 The aggregate exploitation rate of firms in market structure “m” is
always higher than the exploitation rate of the benchmark monopoly, “M ,” namely,
χ∗m > χ
∗
M .
Proof
Using the fact that Nµ = 1 in both cases, we can express the right-hand side of (19) as
a function of Nκ as,
G (χ,Nκ) ≡ Nκ
(θNκ)
β
(
1− 1
η
)
χ−β − ρν
(θNκ)
β χ−β − ν
=
αδ
(
1− 1
η
)
χ
(1− χ)
1
η − αδ (1− χ)
≡ H (χ) . (22)
Since,
G2 (χ,Nκ) =
(θNκ)
β
(
1− 1
η
)
χ−β − ρν
(θNκ)
β χ−β − ν
+
βνθβNβκ
[
ρ−
(
1− 1
η
)]
[
(θNκ)
β χ−β − ν
]2 ,
parameter restriction (14) implies that G2 (χ,Nκ) > 0. The equilibrium strategies in the
two cases are captured by Figure 2, which proves the proposition.
The implication of Proposition 1 is, as in Levhari and Mirman [8], that the dynamic
externality leads to the dominance of the ‘tragedy of the commons,’ irrespective of the
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parameters aﬀecting the demand function, the cost function, growth possibilities given by
f (k), and the endogenous capital depreciation technology.
3.4 The impact of the market externality in addition to the dy-
namic externality
The starting point for studying the impact of the market externality in addition to the
dynamic externality, is the comparison of the market structure of the benchmark monopoly
with the market structure of a duopoly with both ﬁrms, again, utilizing capital from the
same provider.
3.4.1 Comparison of the benchmark monopoly with a duopoly
utilizing capital from the same provider
We express condition (19) somewhat diﬀerently, re-arranging the position of parameter ρ
and setting the right-hand side as,
X (χ) =
αδ
ρ
(
1− 1
η
)
χ
(1− χ)
1
η − αδ (1− χ)
, (23)
which is common for both cases. The two left-hand sides for the respective market structures
are,
ΓM (χ) =
θβ(1− 1η )
ρ
χ−β − ν
θβχ−β − ν
, and Γd (χ) = 2
2ρ−1θβ(1− 12η )
ρ
χ−β − ν
2ρ−1θβχ−β − ν
, (24)
where the parameter constraint (13) has been used. Since the equilibrium conditions in the
two market structures, “M” and “d,” are ΓM (χ) = X (χ) and Γd (χ) = X (χ), the key is to
compare the function ΓM (χ) with Γd (χ).
To simplify notation, let χ−β ≡ z, aM ≡ θ
β
(
1− 1
η
)
/ρ, bM ≡ θ
β, c ≡ 2ρ−1θβ
(
1− 1
2η
)
/ρ,
and d ≡ 2ρ−1θβ. Thus, the two deﬁnitions in (24) imply that,
ΓM (χ) < Γd (χ)⇔
aMz − ν
bMz − ν
< 2
cz − ν
dz − ν
. (25)
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We consider only strategies that lead to positive proﬁts in both setups. From condition
(17) the value function is positive if the marginal proﬁt in each period is positive, namely, if
z > max {ν/aM , ν/c}.
Proposition 2 The aggregate exploitation rate of firms in market structure “d” is
always higher than the exploitation rate of the benchmark monopoly, “M ,” (namely,
χ∗d > χ
∗
M).
Proof
We prove that (25) always holds when proﬁts are positive. For all z > max {ν/aM , ν/c},
both ΓM (χ) and Γd (χ) are strictly positive, so it suﬃces to show that the stronger condition,
aMz − ν
bMz − ν
<
cz − ν
dz − ν
, (26)
always holds, i.e.,
aMz − ν
bMz − ν
<
cz − ν
dz − ν
⇔ z > ν
bM + c− aM − d
cbM − daM
. (27)
For any values of ρ consistent with (14), c > aM , which means that according to the require-
ment that proﬁts be positive in equilibrium, it must be that z > max {ν/aM , ν/c} = ν/aM .
It is easy to show that,
ν
aM
> ν
bM + c− aM − d
cbM − daM
⇔ (c− aM) (bM − aM) > 0 , (28)
which holds in equilibrium, since, under (14), bM > aM , and c > aM . Combining the
requirement that z > ν/aM with (28) and (27), proves that (26) holds. This result implies
(25) and Figure 3 completes the proof.
So, for all parameters of the model, the dynamic externality and the market externality,
together, lead to overexploitation of capital compared to the benchmark monopoly case.
15
3.4.2 Comparison between strategies of two monopolists utilizing
capital from the same provider with the duopoly
To complete the comparison among all market structures, in this section, we compare the
market structure of two monopolists utilizing capital from the same provider, with the market
structure of a duopoly with both ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same provider.
Using condition (19), rearranging terms, and noting that Nκ = 2, in both cases, the
right-hand side of the new version of (19) is,
Ξ (χ) =
αδ
2ρ
(
1− 1
η
)
χ
(1− χ)
1
η − αδ (1− χ)
, (29)
whereas the left-hand sides of the resulting equilirium conditions are,
Λm (χ) =
(2θ)β(1− 1η )
ρ
χ−β − ν
(2θ)β χ−β − ν
, and Λd (χ) =
2
−
1
η (2θ)β(1− 12η )
ρ
χ−β − ν
2−
1
η (2θ)β χ−β − ν
. (30)
The role of the demand elasticity In a static framework with isoelastic demand func-
tions and a general increasing cost function that implies a unique optimum, the comparison
of the aggregate supply of two monopolists with the aggregate supply of the duopolists rests
upon the level of demand elasticity. With the demand elasticity below (above) a critical level,
duopolists supply, on aggregate, more (less) than two monopolists. Consistently, Proposition
3 shows that, in our dynamic model, for all parameter values, there is a threshold demand
elasticity level below which duopolists supply more than the two monopolists, each utilizing
capital from the same source. Yet, unlike the static framework, the comparison may not be
reversed when the demand elasticity is above the threshold level.
Low demand elasticity
Proposition 3 If,
2−
1
η
(
1−
1
2η
)
≥ 1−
1
η
⇔ η ≤ 2.73 ,
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the aggregate exploitation rate of firms in market structure “d” is always higher than the
aggregate exploitation rate of the benchmark monopoly, “m,” (namely, χ∗d > χ
∗
m).
Proof
The two deﬁnitions in (30) imply that,
Λm (χ) < Λd (χ)⇔
amz − ν
bmz − ν
<
cz − ν
dz − ν
⇔
dz − ν
bmz − ν
<
cz − ν
amz − ν
, (31)
where am ≡ (2θ)
β
(
1− 1
η
)
/ρ and bm ≡ (2θ)
β, with the constants c and d deﬁned as above,
and with z restricted to values implying positive proﬁts, namely, z > max {ν/am , ν/c}.
Using (13), d = 2−
1
η (2θ)β < bm, which implies that,
dz − ν
bmz − ν
< 1 . (32)
Using (13) again,
c ≥ am ⇔ 2
− 1
η
(
1−
1
2η
)
≥ 1−
1
η
⇔ η ≤ 2.73 ,
yielding,
1 ≤
cz − ν
amz − ν
, (33)
for all z > max {ν/am , ν/c}. Thus, (32) and (33) imply (31). The resulting equilibrium
exploitation rate of ﬁrms, under the restriction that η ≤ 2.73, is proved by Figure 4.
Note that the only factor behind the cutoﬀ demand elasticity level, below which the mar-
ket externality in addition to the dynamic externality leads to more aggregate exploitation
for all other parameter values, is the number of ﬁrms in the market, Nµ.
Steady States for a low demand elasticity (η ≤ 2.73) When φ > 0, the steady state
growth of capital is zero. Based on Propositions 1 and 3, the steady-state levels of capital
for the three market structures, when η ≤ 2.73, are given by Figure 5, which shows that
kssd < k
ss
m < k
ss
M . For the case that φ = 0 and η ≤ 2.73, growth of the capital stock for a
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duopoly with both ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same provider is lower than in the case of
two monopolistic ﬁrms utilizing capital from the same provider.
Higher demand elasticity (η > 2.73) In the case η > 2.73, it is possible for the two
monopolists to have higher aggregate supply than the duopolists. However, even in our
parametric framework, we cannot characterize this possibility analytically. Thus, we present
a numerical example, depicted in Figure 6. The parameter values are η = 5 (> 2.73), δ = .96
(reﬂecting an interest rate of about 4%), α = .3, ρ = 1, θ = .6, ν = .9, while β is derived
using condition (13), i.e. β = .2 in this example. Figure 6 shows that for these parameter
values, Λm (χ
∗
m) > Λd (χ
∗
m), so χ
∗
d < χ
∗
m. Thus, given Propositions 1 and 2, k
ss
m < k
ss
d < k
ss
M .
In order to identify the factors that lead to strategies χ∗d < χ
∗
m, in what follows we restrict
the numerical example to the parameter values used above, but modify each parameter, one
by one, so as to reverse the result, namely to achieve χ∗d > χ
∗
m. This sensitivity analysis
reveals the contribution of each parameter.14
The impact of a ‘more convex’ cost function (higher ρ) A usual determinant of
a natural monopoly is that its production function exhibits increasing returns to scale, or,
alternatively, a ‘slightly convex’ or even a concave cost function. In our numerical example,
we retain all parameter values at the same level, but we increase the value of ρ, by setting
ρ = 7. As can be seen in Figure 7.a, a ‘more convex’ cost function discourages the two
monopolists from supplying more, leading again to χ∗d > χ
∗
m.
The impact of higher capital-renewal elasticity (higher α) or of a lower interest
rate (higher δ) A higher α implies a higher renewal elasticity of capital. Setting α = .7,
14For details on how we design the numerical counterexamples and a more detailed discussion, see Koulova-
tianos and Mirman [7].
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with all other parameter values set at the levels of the example of Figure 6, we depict the
result in Figure 7.b, where, again χ∗d > χ
∗
m. Note that a higher δ, namely a lower interest
rate (the opportunity cost of a ﬁrm), leads to the same result as increasing α.15
The impact of lower cost (lower ν) or of a faster depreciation technology (higher
θ) In Figure 7.c we have set ν = .8, while for Figure 7.d, we set θ = 1. In both of these
cases all other parameter values, again, are set at the numerical benchmark of Figure 6. In
both Figures, 7.c and 7.d, the result is that χ∗d > χ
∗
m, unlike the implication of Figure 6.
To summarize, Proposition 1 states that the dynamic externality leads to more aggregate
capital utilization, a ‘tragedy of the commons’ result. Proposition 2 shows that the impact of
the dynamic and the market externality combined leads to more aggregate capital utilization.
Proposition 3 states that adding the market externality to a dynamic externality leads to
more aggregate capital utilization if the elasticity of demand is suﬃciently low with the
threshold level of demand elasticity depending only on the number of ﬁrms in the market.
When the elasticity of demand is above this threshold level, it is possible that adding the
market externality to the dynamic externality leads to less aggregate capital utilization,
depending on a combined contribution of a relatively low convexity of the cost function,
relatively low elasticity of capital renewal, relatively high interest rates, and a relatively
weak utilization-dependent depreciation technology.
4. Isolating the market externality: excludability - duopoly with
ﬁrms exploiting capital from diﬀerent providers
In this section we develop a method for studying the problem of a duopolist without a
dynamic externality. We distinguish between two stocks of capital, kA and kB, for the ﬁrms A
15The intrinsic return of keeping a high level of capital is higher if both α is high and if the opportunity cost
is low, i.e. if δ is high. See p. 28-29 in Koulovatianos and Mirman [7].
19
and B, respectively. We assume that the initial capital stocks are equal, i.e., kA,0 = kB,0 > 0.
This market structure eliminates the dynamic externality and allows us to study the isolated
eﬀects of the market externality.
The capital stocks evolve according to,
kA,t+1 = f (kA,t)− ψ (qA,t) , and kB,t+1 = f (kB,t)− ψ (qB,t) . (34)
We use the superscript ‘D’ for this market structure and we denote the value function of
the duopolistic ﬁrms as V A,D and V B,D.16 The problem of the ﬁrm A in a Bellman-equation
form is given by,
V A,D (kA, kB) = max
qA≥0
{
D
(
qA +Q
B,D (kA, kB)
)
qA − C (kA, qA)+
+δV A,D
(
f (kA)− ψ (qA) , f (kB)− ψ
(
QB,D (kA, kB)
))}
, (35)
where QB,D (kA, kB) is the supply strategy of ﬁrm B. The problem of ﬁrm B is given by
switching A and B in the Bellman equation (35). The necessary condition implied by (35)
is,
D
(
qA +Q
B,D (kA, kB)
)
+D1
(
qA +Q
B,D (kA, kB)
)
qA − C2 (kA, qA)
ψ′ (qA)
=
= δ
⎧⎨⎩−C1 (k̂A, q̂A)+
⎡⎣D
(
q̂A +Q
B,D
(
k̂A, k̂B
))
ψ′ (q̂A)
+
+
D′
(
q̂A +Q
B,D
(
k̂A, k̂B
))
q̂A − C2
(
k̂A, q̂A
)
ψ′ (q̂A)
⎤⎦ f ′ (k̂A)+ [D′ (q̂A +QB,D (k̂A, k̂B)) q̂A−
−δV A,D2
(̂̂
kA,
̂̂
kB
)
ψ′
(
QB,D
(
k̂A, k̂B
))]
QB,D1
(
k̂A, k̂B
)⎫⎬⎭ , (36)
16Because all value functions and ﬁrm strategies in this section are bivariate, we use symbols “A,D” and
“B,D” as superscripts, in order to allow for partial derivatives to be denoted as subscripts. Despite this
slight notational discrepancy with the previous sections, this simpliﬁes the exposition.
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where
̂̂
k is the capital stock two periods ahead. The necessary optimal condition of ﬁrm B
is given by the same equation as (36), except that A and B are switched.
In this section we show that for the special case of, φ = 0, i.e.,
f (kA) = α
η
η−1kA = ZkA and f (kB) = α
η
η−1kB = ZkB ,
our example can lead to linear supply strategies with respect to (kA, kB) of the form,
QA,D (kA, kB) = ω1kA + ω2kB , and Q
B,D (kA, kB) = ω1kB + ω2kA . (37)
Assume that (37) holds, then (34) yields,
kˆA = ZkA − θ (ω1kA + ω2kB) , and kˆB = ZkB − θ (ω1kB + ω2kA) . (38)
Using (37) and (38), we construct the value function of ﬁrm A,
V A,D (kA, kB) =
(ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η (kA + kB)
− 1
η (ω1kA + ω2kB)− ν (ZkA)
−β (ω1kA + ω2kB)
ρ
1− β [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
1− 1
η
.
(39)
The Bellman equation of ﬁrm A is,
V A,D (kA, kB) =max
qA≥0
{(
qA +Q
B,D (kA, kB)
)− 1
η qA − νk
−β
A q
ρ
A +
+δ
(ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η
(
ZkA − θqA + ZkB − θQ
B,D (kA, kB)
)− 1
η
1− β [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
1− 1
η
×
×
[
ω1 (ZkA − θqA) + ω2
(
ZkB − θQ
B,D (kA, kB)
)]
−
−δ
−ν [Z (ZkA − θqA)]
−β [ω1 (ZkA − θqA) + ω2 (ZkB − θQB,D (kA, kB))]ρ
1− β [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
1− 1
η
}
.
Taking the ﬁrst-order condition ﬁrst, and, afterwards, imposing symmetry, namely, kˆA =
kˆB = [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)] k and qA = qB = (ω1 + ω2) k, under the parameter constraint (13),
we arrive at the following equation involving ω1 and ω2,
2−
1
η
(
1−
1
2η
)
(ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η−ρνZ−β (ω1 + ω2)
ρ−1 =
21
=
δθ
{
2−
1
η
(
ω1 −
ω1+ω2
2η
)
+ νZ−β
[
ρ (ω1 + ω2)
ρ−1 − β (ω1 + ω2)
ρ
]}
[Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
1
η − β [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
. (40)
Turning now to the necessary condition given by (36), using the value function, (39), the
strategies (37), equations (38), and, imposing the parameter constraint (13) and symmetry,
namely, kˆA = kˆB = [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)] k and qA = qB = (ω1 + ω2) k, we arrive at the second
equation involving ω1 and ω2,
2−
1
η
(
1−
1
2η
)
(ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η−ρνZ−β (ω1 + ω2)
ρ−1 = δ [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
− 1
η
⎧⎨⎩βθν (ω1 + ω2)ρ +
+2−
1
η
(
1−
1
2η
)
(ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η − ρνZ−β (ω1 + ω2)
ρ−1 −
θ (ω1 + ω2)
− 1
η
2η
−
−
δθ2ω2
[
2−
1
η
(
ω1 −
ω1+ω2
2η
)
− ρνω2Z
−β (ω1 + ω2)
ρ−1
]
[Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
1
η − β [Z − θ (ω1 + ω2)]
⎫⎬⎭ . (41)
Thus, equations (40) and (41) reconfirm that the strategies, QA,D (kA, kB) and Q
B,D (kA, kB)
are, indeed, linear.
The calculation method we suggest combines the separate information obtained from, (a)
the necessary condition with asymmetric stocks, (36), and, (b) from the necessary condition
resulting from the Bellman equation, (39), where the implied dynamics of the symmetric
strategies have already been imposed on the value function. Yet, in equilibrium, the necessary
condition (36), with ex-ante asymmetric stocks (but ex-post symmetry, when calculating ω1
and ω2), and the Bellman equation (that has ex-ante the symmetry imposed on the dynamic
path leading to the lifetime proﬁts of the ﬁrm), give the same information. So, there are
two diﬀerent but equivalent equations, (40) and (41), a 2x2 system with ω1 and ω2 being
the unknowns. Thus, the method we suggest in this section tackles the diﬃcult problem of
calculating the equilibrium strategies in an industry with such a market structure.
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